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USIMINAS operates under the terms agreed upon in the so-called. 
Horikoshi-lanari agreement, which establishes an initial production target 
of 500,OCX) tons of ingot steel per year. 
The Federal Government of Brazil now holds about 80 per cent of the 
shares of USIMINAS, more than 50 per cent being in the hands of the Banco 
Nacional do Desenvolvimento Economico. In 1957 the.Japanese company 
Nippon USIMDJAS K.K. held 40 per cent of the shares. Their stock is now 
19 per cent. 
It is emphasized that USIMINAS enjoys great independence in making 
decisions on matters of finance. The fact that it receives the greater 
part of its financial support from the Government does not reduce this 
independence. It has a high degree of administrative stability, thanks 
to the attitude of non-intervention adopted by the Government. 
USIMINAS has been able to develop an entrepreneurial spirit, largely 
by virtue of the terms set out in the Horikoshi-Lanari agreement. 
As regards financing, a major difficulty has been the rapid inflation 
in Brazil. In ten years, the capital of the company increased 114 times as 
a reflection of the inflation, and, measured in dollars, it increased from 
72 to 90 million. It is easy to imagine the difficulties of long and 
medium-terni financial programming in those circumstances. 
The Brazilian Government is deeply involved in the nation's iron and 
steel work, controlling more than half of total production. It is felt that 
a revision is needed of the forms in which this influence and control are 
exercised. At present, various government bodies control different steel mills. 
Co-ordination is inadequate, USIMINAS advocates the restructuring of 
organizations concerned with iron and steel making including both public and 
private enterprises in this field. The government bodies should: 
(1) Not intervene directly in the administration of the enterprises; 
(2) Maintain competition in order to guarantee efficiency; 
(3) Not discriminate between public and private enterprises through 
tax exemptions or credit facilities. 
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There should be two government bodies in charge of the implementation 
of iron and steel policies, viz.: on the one hand, a council to draft the 
policies, to establish general criteria for fundamental decisions regarding 
investments, to approve of iron and steel-making plans within the limits of 
the national policy, and to suggest price policies; and on the other, a 
financial enterprise which should amass, the resources (public and private? 
national and foreign) required to finance the relevant projects, and 
participate as co-owner in the iron and steel mills. 
In its quest for means of achieving financial equilibrium, US BUNAS 
has been able to increase production from 500,000 to 800,000 tons of ingot 
steel without major additional investment. They consider it possible to 
reach one million tons with only limited amount of additional investment. 
It is noted that this increase of production goes hand in hand with, a 
reduction in personnel: since 1965 the members have dropped from 9,200 to 
5,500, The means of improving productivity discussed in this paper are 
reorganization, introduction of standard costs, delegation of authority, 
control systems and sales programming. 
A thorough discussion of the problems of depreciation is held, 
covering linear (or constant) depreciation, depreciation as a function of 
the volume of production, and depreciation as a function of the number 
of hours the equipment is used. 
For short-life equipment, e.g. office equipment, USIMINAS uses a flat 
depreciation rate, and for equipment used approximately ten years, a rate 
that varies with the amount of production. Long-life equipment, say 
twenty-five years, carries depreciation rates according to a clock-shaped 
curve over the years. That is, the rate approximates a discrete 
representation of the normal distribution. In this way, a low rate is 
applied, during the first low-yield years, and during the last years of 
usage when the equipment is no longer fully competitive with its more 
modern successors. The years of peak productivity carry the highest rates 
of depreciation. 
